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I  am  most  grateful  to  this  Institution  for  the 
opportunity it provides  me  to  state  some  views  on  the 
problems  of  monetary  integration  in  the  E.E.C.  But  I 
am  also  well  aware  of  doing  this  in  front  of  such  distinguished 
experts  in  the  field  and  not  in  the  least  among  them  one 
whom  I  have  considered  for  many  years  as  my  master.  By 
the  way,  I  do  not  know  if  this  acknowledgement  will  please 
him. 
As  you  probably  will  know,  the  academic  life is  like 
the  creation  of  the  universe,  code  epoch  following  another 
one,  some  new  species  coming  to  life,  some  old  ones  vanishing 
and  some  other  ones  degenerating.  Now  this  is  especially 
true  for  that  kind  of  species  known  as  "Economist",  some  of 
them  have  managed  to  keep  all  their  characteristics,  some 
have  evolved  as  business  or  administration  economists  and,alas, 
some  others  have  degenerated  into  an  almost  unrecognizable 
category:  the  politician economist  of  whom  you  see  before 
you,  a  representative. 
Since  the  emergence  in  the  19th  century  of  an  "international 
economy",  no  concept  has  been  more  relative  than  that  of  national 
sovereignty  in monetary  matters.  And  the  principle  between  the 
different  currencies  has  been  even  more  questionable. 
', For  more  than  a  century  the  rule  ha&  been  that  currencies 
exist  s~de  by  side  in  the  hands  of  transactors  - or  of  certain 
major  categories  of  transactors  - in  a  sort  of  hierarchical 
pattern  of  monetary  systems.  Some  currencies  have  been 
followed  by  sterling,  and  now  the  dollar  since  the  thirties. 
There  are  ~ional currencies  whose  roles~  increasing  or 
declining,  cover  a  limited  number  of  countries:  the  IDOE!t 
outstanding  example  is sterling  since  the  thirties;  also  the 
franc  and  the  mark  before  the  first  World  War;  the  German  Mark, 
expecially  in  the  context  of  the  "reduced  snake",  can  be 
considered  as  an  embryo  of  a  regional  currency.  Finally  there 
are  national  monetary  areas  within  which,  for  centuries,  the 
law  has  sought  to  give  the  prince  the  mon~oly of  issuing  legal 
tender;  but  this  monopoly  has  never  been  absolute,  since it 
is  constantly  limited  by  the  competition  from  some  currencies 
issued  by  other  princes. 
The  role  of  the  "Nation-State"  in  the  monetary  organi-
zation  declined  during  the  period  of  the  gold  standard: 
between  1875  and  1914  the  situation  of  the  western world 
(and  of  its dependencies)  was  like  that  of  a  sort  of  genera-
lized  monetary  union.  The  Nation  State  increased  its monetary 
role  in  the  inter-war  years.  But  after  the  second  world  war 
this  role  tended  again  to  diminish:  the  national  currencies 
gave  over  so  many  of  their  functions  to  the  dollar  that  the 
international monetary  relations  were  frequently  likened  to 
a  universal  dollar  standard.  During  a  certain period,  this 
system  worked  apparently well,  although it implied  inevitably 
some  s t ra.ins  within  the  "under lying"  Nation  States;  strains 3
resulting  f. rom  an  eventual  cc.Hlf lic:t  butHI.'H!n  the  ne<!d  to  make 
allowance  for  the  effects  of  US  monetary  pollcy  on  the  national 
economic  situation  and  the  pursuit  of  national  objectives. 
By  the  end  of  the  sixties,  the  system  ran  into  repeated 
international  crises.  These  developments  triggered  of  reactions 
which  gave  rise  to  a  powerful  current  of  though  hostile  to  the 
system  of  stable  exchange  rates  set  up  by  the  IMF  Articles  of 
Agreement. 
In  the  purest  form,  the  floating  excange  rate  method  is 
free  trade  and  universalist  inspired  (absence  of  all  government 
intervention  in  external  monetary  policy).  But  in  practice 
things  are  different:  government  cannot  allow  that  their 
economic  policies,  or  the  levels  of  employment,  be  exposed 
to  "unreasonable"  speculative  movements.  So  at  lease  for  the 
more  important  countries,  clean  floating  is  only  a  academic 
construction;  dirty  floating  is  the  real  alternative.  And 
we  know  from  the  experience  of  the  thirties  that  this  method 
can  lead  from  monetary  nationalism  to  economic  nationalism. 
It must  also  be  stressed  that  floating  exchange  rates  can 
lead  to  a  "vicious  circle":  the  higher  cost  of  imparts  adds 
', 
to  inflationary pressure.  The  recent  examples  of  the  United 
Kindom  and  Italy are  a  striking illustration of  these  dangers. 
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On  the  ather  hand,  countries  with  a  currency  that  tends 
to  be  relatively strong  in relation  to  the  others  are  in•.a 
better situation with  floating  rates,  particularly if their 
economy  is  of  a  "dominant  type"  (as  Perroux  would  call it) 
and  large  enough  to  set  off  a  chain  reaction.  These  countries 
export  their  inflation  - their  products  being  bough  at  any  rate  -
and,  insofar  as  a  large  proportion  of  their  markets  are  in  the 4
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count~ics affected  by  the  chain  reaction.  the  effects  on 
exports  and  employment  ts  reduced.  It is  no  doubt  a  chain 
reaction  of  this  type  that  starts  the  process  whereby  a 
strong  currency,  with  a  sufficiently  broad  economic  base, 
tends  to  move  beyond  the  national  frontiers  to  become  a  key 
currency  to  reserve  currency  at  regional  or'international level. 
The  controversy  on  the  subject  of  fixed  or  flexible 
exchange  rates  led  a  growing  of  economists  to  affirm  that 
neither  the  national  pole  nor  the  universal  pole  of  ~onetary 
organization  provide  the  possibility  of  an  optimum  organization 
of  monetary  relations.  The  fundamental  idea  is  that  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  economic  optimum,  monetary  and  national 
frontiers  do  not  necessarily  coincide. 
So,  to  speak  of  European  National  States,  they  can  choose 
betwean  the will  to  satisfy  some  of  their  own  political  and 
social  objectives  and  the  will  to  take  advantage  of  the  benefits 
flowing  from  the  continuity  and  expansion  of  economic  trans-
actions  across  frontiers. 
If  the  latter  should  predominate,  and  the  economies  in 
question  open  up  to  each  other  beyond  a  certain level,  then 
the  factors  of  production  themselves  (capital,  enterprises, ••• ) 
will  develop  a  nigh  degree  of  mobility,  the  difference  between 
the  political  and  social objectives will  wane  and  adjustments 
will  tend  to  be  made  through  moderate  changes  in  the  application 
of  economic  policy  instruments.  At  a  ce~tain stage,  managing 
the  exchange  rate  becomes  meaningless  of  undesirable.  All  the 
characteristics  of  an  "optimum  currency  area" will  then  be  present. 5
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At  a  timH  noted  for  the  economic  intcrv~utionlaw of  the 
of  the  public  authorities,  such  a  development  cannot  occur 
without  deliberate  harmonization  of  the  policies  of  the  States 
concerned.  It  is  sometimes  added  (Werner  Report)  that it is 
essential  to  set  up  a  decision-making  center  for  certain fields. 
However  it will  become  clear  that  the  scope  and  incidence  of 
such  an  approach  could  differ,  depending  on  which  of  two  patterns 
is  generally  followed:  the  gradual  narrowing  of  margi~s between 
the  currencies  of  the  Member  States,  or  the  creation of  a  common 
currency  which  would  exist  side  by  side with  national  currencies. 
A  few  more  specific  indications  on  the  steps  the  European 
countries  might  take  along  the  path  indicated  above  would  now 
seem  appropriate. 
II •.  Why  a  common  European  currency? 
While  the  Treaty  of  Rome  did  not  introduce  the  tendency 
towards  regional  integration,  it is  important  for  having  more 
or  less  explicitly acknowledged  that  the  Nation  State  is  no 
longer  the  optimal  production  area  and  the  optimal  trading  area. 
The  Nation  State  has  ceased  to  be  the  exclusive,  and 
~ 
in  some  countries  and  under  certain conditions,  even  pre~ 
dominant  framework  of  economic  life,  and  the  importance  of  the 
regional  context  has  been  confirmed.  This  has  had  a  considerable 
impact  on  material well-being  and  growth,  which  would  be  difficult 
to  call  into  question; 
It  would  seem  that  these  changes  could  have  occurred  without 
more  or·less parallel  changes  in  the  monetary  field  if  the 6
' . 
universal  dollar  standard  had  heen  cataulished  smoothly.  Just 
ns  in the  19th  century  the  Western  world  moved  into  a  universal 
monetary  union  basad  on  the  gold  standard,  Europe  could,  and 
still can,  move  into  a  similar  system  based  on  the  dollar. 
ln  this  connection,  it should  be  emphasized  that  on  the  effective 
basis  provided  by  the  dollar,  European  monetary  relations 
developed  without  any  major  disruptions  (one  revaluat~on of 
the  German  mark)  from  1958  to  1968,  insj.de  a  "tunnell"  of  1.50%. 
Why  then  has  a
11tunnel
11  of  4.5%  become  untenable  today?,  and  also 
a  '!snake"  of  2.25%. 
The  immediate  reply  to  this  question  is  the  growth  of  inflation-
ary  pressures  and  their  uneven  development  in  the  different 
European  countries.  But  this  begs  another  question.  What  is 
behind  the  disturbances  which  have  made  it impossible  for  the 
European  currencies  to  coexist  inside  the  margins  of  Fluctua-
tion,  even  when  expanded? 
No-one  has  yet  measured  the  share  of  responsibility  that  can 
be  attributed  to  strains  born  of  divergences  in  European  national 
policies,  and  the  role  played  directly  or  indirectly by  the 
impulses  triggered  by  inflationary pressure  in~the United  States. 
This  pressure  is  transmitted  both  by  the  "real" effects  ofan 
increase  in American  demand  and  by  the  "monetary"  effects  stemming 
from  the  operation  of  the  international  monetary  system  in  force 
until  the  beginning  of  1973  (stable  rates,  intervention  in dollars) 
during  a  period  of  rapid  and  substantial  increases  in  the  deficit 
of  the  United  States. 7
Be  that  us  it may,  these  preusurea  war~ too  strong  for 
the  fragile  frmnnwork  of  progress  towards  European  monetary 
union,  originally  (Werner  Report)  conceived  as  a  sort  of 
slightly  amended  version  of  the  universal  standard  system 
(the  1uethod  of  the  Community  "snake"  in  the  dollar  "tunnel" 
to  be  implemented  only  by  intervention  in  dollars). 
In  the  great  debate  which  had  begun  on  the  virtues  of 
this  scheme,  the  "economists"  readily  predicted  the  early 
end  of  the  "snake"  on  the  grounds  of  existing  and  foreseeable 
deficiencies  in  the  harmonization  of  policies.  They  were 
unaware  of  a  danger- which  the 
11monetarists"  also  failed  to 
point  out:  the  pressures  on  the  snake  itself originating  in 
the  instability of  the  dollar.  The  monetarists  merely  asserted 
that  monetary  mechanisms  would  have  the  effect  of  mitigating, 
or  even  eliminating  the  deficiences  of  harmonization.  In 
other  words,  they  wan~ed to  achieve  economic  integration  by 
building  on  monetary  integration,  which  is. impossible. 
The  lessons  drawn  from  the  snake's  various  mishaps  tend 
to  be  exaggerated,  to _say  the  least.  In  short,  it is  asserted 
that  one  should  guard  against  embarking  on  new  monetary  adventures. 
This  is  taken  to  mean  that  the  isolated  floating  of  the  main 
European  currencies  is  inevitable at  theyresent  time  and  that 
currencies  which  have  left  the  "snake"  should  not  be  allowed 
to  return  to  it, at  least until policies  have  been  sufficiently 
harmonized.  But  there  is  some  reluctance  to  calculate  the  distance 
to  be  travelled  and  anticipate  the  consequences  ofth~ .establish-
ment  of  a  "mark  area"  which  the  German  authorities  themselves 
have  constantly  insisted  that  they  did  not  want. 
', 8 This  tendency  is  dangerous  in  more  than  one  respect  for 
the  Community's  future.  It  cannot  fail  to  have  serious  conse-
quences  for 
11real  integ1:ntion
11  in  Europe,  and  even  if  the  danger 
of  protectionist  outbidding  is  ignored,  it will  make  it even 
more  difficult  to  combat  the  effects  of  the  oil crisis. 
In  view  of  the  considerable difficulties affecting  sterling 
and  the  lira,  itis hard  to  imagine  these  currencies  returning 
to  the  snake  in  the  forseeable  future;  however  this  prospect 
does  not  look  utopian  as  far  as  the  French  franc  is  concerned. 
With  this  in  mind,  it would  be  sensible  to  introduce  immediately 
some  machinery  based  on  the  experience  gained  with  the  functions 
of  the  snake.  It might  will  be  necessary  to  refrain  from 
proclaiming  for  all  to  hear  the  possible  size  of  an  "enlarged  snake", 
and,  for  some  time  to  be  satisfied with  moving  towards  the  rein-
troduction  of  some  sort  of  Community  margins,  but  using  Flexible 
methods.  Such  a  structure would,  by  itself,  justify  a  start in 
pooling  reserves,  but  its main  purpose,  at  the  ~resent time, 
would  be  to  force  a  rapid  solution  to  the  gold  problem  and  to 
make  it possible  to  begin  the  process  of  creating  a  common 
European  currency  - later  referred  to  as  the  "Europa"  - to 
replace  the  dollar  in its functions  as  "key  currency"  within 
Europe. 
We  must  have  no  illusions  on  this  subject.  The  creation 
of  a  "Europe"  in anticipation  of  the  recent  period  of  amrked 
instability of  the  dollar,  and  the  transfer  to  a  common  European 
currency  of  the  functions  reserved  in  practice  for  the  US 
currency  (in  particular  intervention  for  the  purpose  of 
managing  the  foreign  exchange  markets)  might  perhaps  have 
spared  Europe  some  disruptions. 
', 9 However,  tho  present  outlook  is  for  the  US  economy  to 
stability,  und  we  mus  D~t  Liturofo~e expect  that  recourse  to 
the  "Europa"  t.,ould,  in  the  immediate  future,  be  in  any  wa':(  an 
improvement  on  the  technical  efficiency  of  the  dollar  in its 
functions  as  an  international  currency  (intervention,  settlements, 
res et·ves). 
Indeed  the  actual  situation is  not  very  much  in  favour 
of  a  new  process  towards  European  monetary  integration.  As 
a  consequence  of  the  energy  crisis,  the  weakness  of  some  European 
currencies  - and  economies  - has  become  more  apparent,  the 
strength  of  the  American  economy  has  been  better appreciated, 
and  the  dominant  role  of  the  dollar is  again  largely  accepted. 
This  would  mean  that  any  ideas  about  regional  monetary  poles 
become  less  attratiV.e;  in  other words,  that  we  are  moving 
away  from  monetary  regionalism,  and  that  the  universal  dollar-
based  system  could  again  - in  a  slightly modified  form  - rule 
our  international monetary  relations,  for  some  rears  at  least. 
Some  form  of  regionalism  could  (continue  to)  develop  inside 
the  universal  dollar-system,  on  the  basis  of  the  German  economy 
and  the  German  Mark.on  the  one  side,and  the  yen  on  the  other  side. 
As  far  as  Europe  is  concerned,  the  "snake-of-five-countries" 
is  already  an  embryo  of  the  described  mixture • 
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But  I  would  like  to  add  one  fundamental  consideration.  The  arguments 
mentioned  above  only  take  into  account  the  economic  and  monetary 
forces  at  play.  But  the  European  monetary  integration has  not 
only  been  initiated and  pushed  on  the  basis  of  economic  considerations. 10 From  the  very  beginnina,  it has  been  an  outstanding  aim  of  our 
monetary  integration  to  be  a  powerful  argument  on  the  road  to 
political integration.  As  is  stated  in  the  Conclusions  of 
the  Werner  Report: 
II  Economic  and  monetary  union  means  that  the  principal 
decisions  of  economic  policy will be  taken  at  Community  level 
and  therefore  that  the  necessary  powers  will be  transferred 
from  the  national  plane  to  the  Community  plane.  These 
transfers  of  responsibility  and  the  creation of  the  corresponding 
Community  institutions  represent  a  precess  of  fundamental  political 
cooperation.  The  economic  and  monetary  union  thus  appears  as 
a  leaven  for  the  development  of  political  union  which  in  the 
long  run  it will  be  unable  to  do  without. 
II 
III.  How  can  a  common  European  currency  be  achieved? 
European  monetary  union  should  be  pursued  by  either  by 
coordinating  exchange  rate  policies  (the  "snake" method  or 
creating  a  common  currency. 
For  progress  to  be  made  in  implementing  the  method  of 
coordinating  exchange  rate policies  there will  have  to  be 
progress  in  coordinating  economic  policies.  In  the  present 
state of  affairs,  it is  not  possible  forJexchange  rate  policies 
to  be  fitted  in  to  a  narrow  band (the 
11 snake 
110  ~1hich is valid 
for  all  currencies.  It is necessary  to  await  more  favourable 
circumstances  and  in  the  meantime  to  have  a  "joint float"  Community 
currencies.  It is  impossible  to  say  at  present  just  how  long 
it will  be  before  such  an  operation  could  lead  to  exact  fluctuation 
margins  being  defined  for  all  EEC  currencies  and  then  these 
margins  being  narrowed  hy  stages. 
', 11 Let  us  face  the  grim  reality: 
Never,  Since  many  years,  has  there  b~en in  the  European 
Community  su~h a  disarray  und  such  a  discrepancy  between 
robot  Governmentssay  and  what  they  do.  They  are  powerless 
in  front  of  evolution  of  the  economic  situation.  They  are  no 
more  able  to  use  effectively  the  instruments  of  monetary  cooperation. 
They  are  most  of  the  time  out  of  step  in  their  economic  policies 
and  when  not  it is  much  the  consequence  of  haphazard!X  taken. 
decisions  that  the  result  of  ,th~ir  comm2n. ]Olitical will. 
In  the  field  of  international monetary  policy  there  are  few 
who  still believe  europe  is  endowed  with  the  power  to  influence 
the  American  attitude  regarding  the  international monetary  reform 
and  the  evolution  o£  their balance  of  payments;  Espically  now, 
that  the  time  seems  to  have  arrived  at  which  the  US  will  give 
hand ling  Europe  with  "  b-~gning neglect" 
The  stages  approach  should  be  adopted  and  applied  to 
bringing  a  common  currency  into  operation.  Three  main  stages 
might  be  proposed: 
I.  A  brief  preliminary  stage,  primarily  to  launch  the  common 
currency; 
II.  An  intermediate  stage  during  which  use  of  the  common  currency 
would  be  developed  so  that  it could  even~ually replace  the  dollar 
as  an  intervention  currency,  which  implies  that it would  be 
circulating widely  in  the  marker;  its position  in  relation  to 
the  national  currencies  would  then  be  similar  to  that  of  the 
dollar  and  the  Euro-dollar  today;  to  be  more  precise,  during 
this  stage,  theright  to  modify  exchange  relationship  between 
the  common  currency  and  the  national  currencies  would  still 
exist;  this  stage  would  be  of  indefinite duration,  and  likely to be long; 
IJ 12 Ill.  In  the  final  stago  exchange  rate  relationship  betweun 
the  common  European  currency  and  the  national  currencies  would 
be  finally  fixed  and  the  fluctuation  margins  would  have  disappeared, 
(the  narrowing  of  margins  having  been  completed);  the  eco1nond.c 
andmonetary  consequences  of  this  state of  affairs  would  be  almost 
identical  to  those  corresponding  to  the  disappea~ance of  national 
currencies  and  their  replacement  by  the  common  European  currency 
which  had  become  the  sole  one. 
I  would  like  to  mention .in  this  context  that  I  have 
always  considered  that  in  any  case~  whatever  method  of  monetary 
integration is  followed,  the  co-existence  of  national  currencies 
and  a  European  currency  during  a  long  number  of  years  seems 
unavoidable.  A  national  currency  has  very  deep  roots  in  the 
"economic  psychology
11  of  people,  as  is  shown  by  the  long 
period  during  which  Frenchmen  went  on  counting  in  "old  Francs". 
To  replace  our  different national  currencies  by  a  European  common. 
currency  would  be  much  more  difficult  than  the  decimalization 
of  sterling!!  So  during  at  leat  several  years,  or  even  a  decade,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  allow  the  continued  existence  of  the  national 
currencies,  in·:a  declining  role ..•  while  the  European  currency 
would  be  gradually  more  and  more  used  ,  starting with  intra-
european  and  internation  payments. 
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The  first manifestation  of  this will  must  be  action  to 
give  this  currency  its  own  identy.  This  will  not  only  mean 
giving it a  name-the  best  one  found  so  far  is  "Europa"  - but 
above  all  endowing  it with  characteristics  enabling it effectively 
to  fulfill  the  funcitons  of  a  currency  (unitof  account,  medium  of 
exchange  and  store  of  value).  The  "Founding  Father"  of  the  Europa 
being  here,  I  loose it gladly  to  him  to  comment  further  on  it. 13
Ill -4 
Tl1e  institutional  boaia  for  th~  creation  of  the  Europa  has 
already  been  described  in  the  report  by  the  Commlsslon  of  the  Eu-
ropean  Communities  presented  to  the  Council  on  30  June  1973,  on  which 
the  latter has  not  yet  taken  a  decision.  In  this  report,  the  Commission 
proposed  that  the  European  Monetary  Cooperation  Fund,  established  in 
1972  (to  fulfill  a  very  modest  role  which  became  further  reduced  as 
an  increasing  number  of  European  currencies  were  floated  indepen-
dently),  should  be  transformed  into  a  kind of European  Bank  respon-
sible  for  the  issue  of  European  Monetary  Units  of  Account"  (EMUA) 
with  which  the  central  bank  of  member  states  of  the  Community  would 
be  credited  against  the  gold  reserves  {and  assets  linked  to  gold) 
and  dollars  pooled,  with  the  title thereto  being  transferred  to  the 
Fund. 
In  presenting  its  report,  the  Commission  drew  attention  to  one  of 
the  problems  whose  solution  was  a  precondition  for  the  implementation 
of  the  project.  This  is  the  definition  of  the  unit  of  account,  or  more 
exactly,  as  stated  above,  of  the  link  to  be  established  between  the  new 
currency  and  the  national  currencies.  Since it was  proposed  to  issue ~he 
EMUA  or  Europas  against  pooled  reserves  and  that  these  Europas  should 
become  the  means  of  settlement  between  central  banks  for  clearing  the 
J 
balances  resulting  from  their  market  transactions,  it was  important 
to  determine  an  equivalence  ratio  be~tween the  pooled  reserves  and  the 
Europas  and  a  conversion  rate  between  the  national  currencies  and  the 
Europas. 
At  the  same  time,  it would  be  possible  for  European  countries 
to  mobilize  their  gold  by  pooling it.  Only  on  this  condition will  Eu-
rope's  creditor  countries  - and  especially  the  Arab  countries  - be 14
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likely  to  invasc  their  surplus  funds  in  Europa- denominated  issues 
floated  by  the  European  Fund  itself or  by  the  private  sector. 
Is  stated  above.  the  question  is  not  merely  one  of  finding  an 
equivalence  ratio  with  a  view  to  issuing  Europas  against  European 
reserves  and  Arab  investments  ;  an  exchange  rate  relationship  between 
the  Europa  and  the  national  currencies  of  European  countries  and  non-
member  countries  (above  all  the  dollar)  must  also  be  established,  to 
make  it  ~ossible to  convert  from  one  to  the  other  before  a  sufficiently 
broad  and  diversified  market  has  developed  to  allow  the  Europa  to  find 
its  own  exchange  rate. 
This  relationaship  cannot  be  established  by  determining  a  fixed 
price  for  the  Europa  in  terms  of  gold,  to  which  the  national  currencies 
would  then  be  linked,  Such  a  solution  is  desirable  n~ither from  the 
technical  point  of  view  (at  what  level  should  the  gold  price  be  fixed 
and  for  how  long  ?)  nor  from  the  economic  point  of  view  (the  "comma-
dity"  currency  system  of  which  basing  the  Europa  on  gold  would  be  a 
variant,  belongs  to  an  earlier  stage  in  human  evolution)  nor,  lastly, 
from  the  political point  of  view  (an  international  consensus  on  the 
matter  must  be  found  and  a  number  of  countries  or  groups  of  countries~ 
are  opposed).  The  most  attractive solution,  in  the  present  circums-
tances,  is  to  define  the  Europa  in  terms  of  what  is  sometimes  called 
a  ''basket''  or  representative  collection  of  European  currencies.  Accor-
ding  to  this  method,  all  the  European  currencies  would  be  grouped  to-
gether  in  proportions  yet  to  be  defined; ·the  resulting  unit  would 
constitute  a  Europa. 
The  objective  to  be  attained  with  a  view  to  progressing  from  the 
initial  to  the  intermadiate  stage  in  the  Europa
1 s  existence will  be 
to  bring  this  currency  to  play  a  part  in  monetary  relations  between 15
Community  countries  - and  possibly  between  the  latter and  other  coun-
tries  - analogous  to  that  played  by  the  dollar  particularly where  the 
latter currency's  official  function  is  concerned  (intervention  on 
exchanga  markets  and  reserve  role)  and  that  of  the  Eurodollar  in  the 
private  sector.  The  structure  corttemplated  would  be  as  follows  : 
- The  European  Fund  would  be  responsible  for  monetary  policy 
in relation  to  the  Europa  and  management  of  its exchange  rate against 
the  dollar; 
- The  central  banks  of  membar  states  would  retain full  authority 
over  the  monetary  policy  applicable  to  their  own  currencies  and  would 
be  responsible  for  managing  the  exchange  rates  of  their  currencies 
against  the  Europa  (and  no  longer  gainst  the  dollar);  until  the  end 
of  this  intermediate  phase,  the  national  monetary  authorities  would 
remain  entirely free  to  determine  the  exchange  rates  of  their  currencies 
against  the  Europa,  whether  they  decide  - at  least initially  - in 
favour  of  a  floating  exchange  rate,  or  whether,  at  a  later~stage, 
they  confine  the  flu~tuations of  their  currencies'  exchange  rates 
within·a  limited  band  (the  "snake")  intended  to  be  narrowed  progressi-
vely  as  economic  and  monetary  union  proceeds. 
Not  only  should  the  public  authorities  be  encouraged  to  use  the 
Europa  as  an  instrument  od  account,  but  it must  establish itself as 
J 
a  unit  in  terms  of  which  negotiable  assets  are  denominated  on  the  market. 
The  authorities  could  have  recourse  to  the  following  measures  : 
- the  issue  of  bonds  denominated  in  Europas,  by  the  Community's 
public  institutions  (ECSC,  European  Investment  Bank); 
In  assessing  the  costs  of  an  operation  of  this  kind,  it should 
not  be  forgotten  that  the  development  of  a  European  "supranational" 
currency  would  enable  European  countries  to  lessen  their  dependance 
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on  the  dollar  as  tho  US  currency  would  progressively  be  displaced  by 
Europa  •  Furthermore,  one  cannot  exclude  that  the  dollar  could  again 
be  aubj•ct  to  upveals  in  the  future,  as  a  result  of  the  development 
of  inflationary  pressures  in  the  United  States.  In  the  meantime  the 
Europ~an countries  have  developed  a  monetary  sytem  of  their  own  based 
on  Europas,  they  could  avoid  some  of  the 
11imported
11  disturbances 
they  have  experienced  during  recent  years.  We  should  not  underestimate 
the  difficulties  of  this  enterprise,  which  in  the  same  time  point 
to  weaknesses  of  the  "snake
11  approach.  Governments  and  central  banks 
of  some  meber  states  are  against  any  significant 
of  reserves,  if  only  because  they  keep  a  sizeable  amount  of  their 
reserves  in  the  form  of  gold.  Also  because  they  do  not  want  some 
other  countries  to  run  permanent  deficits with  the  European  Monetary 
Fund~  in  the  present  political-economical  framework  of  the  Community. 
Finally,  I  would  again  underline  the  political significance  of 
mo~etary integration.  In  saying  this,  I  do  not  so  much  take  into 
consideration  that  fact  that it is difficult  for  the  European  countries 
to  develop  economic  and  social  policies  of  their  own  as  long  as  their 
monetary  relations  are  entirely  based  on  the  dollar.  I  am  simply  thi~ki 
of  the  fact  that,  whereas  a  monetary  union  can  exist  between  countries 
keeping  a  large  measure  of  political  independanca  (cf.  Ireland  and  the 
United  Kingdom)  a  political  union  cannot  be  conceived  without  a  mone-
tary  union.  If  we  want  to  develop  a  European  identity,  and  a  true 
partner  for  Atlantic  cooperation,  we  will  need  a  monetary  union. 
The  making  of  Europe  is  an  endeavour  fraught  with  uncertainity. 
European  were  less  fortunate  than  Americans  who  succeeded  in building 
their  unity  merely  after  one  civil war.  It  tookthe  Europeans  many  of 
them  to  realize  that  by  continuing  to  wagewar  they  were  bringing  Euro-
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penn  civilization  to  the  verge  of  total  destruction.  Half  a  century 
elapsed  since  Paul  Valery  issuedhis  famous  warning  to  his  fellow 
Europeans  :  ''  We,  civilizations,  we  know  that  we  are  mortal 11 •  Sometimes, 
it  looks  as  if  the  warning  has  only  been  taken  to  heart  for  short 
periods  of  time,  The  Europeans  should,  I  guess,  ask  to  themselves 
the  question  whether  Europe  is  not  again  proceeding  through  a  dark 
period  of  scepticism,  sef  negation  and  despondecy. 